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11 Introduction
Food is one of the most crucial elements in sustaining human life. Meat, from which the
majority of animal proteins are drawn, is an integral part of many people’s diet. During
the past two decades, meat consumption in several developed economies and in the U.S. in
particular has been a hotspot of continual economic research. It is often hypothesized that
structural break has occurred that shifted consumer preferences away from red meat toward
chicken and ﬁsh (e.g., Chavas 1983; Thurman 1987; Chalfant and Alston 1988; Sakong and
Hayes 1993). Although agricultural economists still debate whether consumption can be
explained by variations in prices and income alone or other factors are also responsible,
ﬁndings of structural change are common. The suspected preference shift has more than
academic interest. Understanding the causes of this change is of direct interest to the industry
and policy makers. This has prompted some authors to estimate parameters apart from
prices and incomes.
The most often speculated cause of preference change is the inﬂux of health information
on cholesterol and saturated fat in red meat. Kinnucan et al. (1997) ﬁnd that the number
of published medical articles on cholesterol has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on meat demand and has
larger elasticities than price elasticities. McGuirk et al. (1995) arrive at similar conclusions.
But these observations do not completely dispel the skepticism. Most studies that do conﬁrm
a structural break suggest that it occurred somewhere between mid- to late-1970s. However,
Robenstein and Thurman (1996) ﬁnd that red meat futures market does not respond to
release of articles in the Wall Street Journal on the adverse health eﬀects of dietary choles-
2terol. Furthermore, all of the ”strong” and most of the ”moderate” and ”weak” articles on
cholesterol were published after 1982. The newspaper index of cholesterol in McGuirk et
al. also indicates that consumers were not bombarded with such information until the early
1980s.
Davis (1997) questions the methodological foundation of the research on structural break
in meat consumption. He advocates that researchers should not be pinned down on testing
for structural break per se, which, by the laws of logic, isn’t at all valid. Instead, a more
progressive and fruitful approach is to relax some of the theoretical assumptions embedded
in the classical static consumption framework that has been predominantly used in meat
demand studies. The aforementioned papers on cholesterol information eﬀects are consid-
ered progressive because the list of potentially important determinants of meat demand is
expanded.
In this paper and its empirical sequel, the underlying assumption of intertemporal sepa-
rability is altered to allow for temporally interdependent preferences. It is shown that this
modiﬁcation implies a richer set of consumption behavior that is improbable within the static
demand paradigm. By introducing habit formation into meat demand analysis, we are able
to investigate the short- and long-run responses of consumption to transitory and permanent
price and quality changes. If meat consumption is habitual, the long-run response will be
more elastic than the short-run response to a permanent change in price or quality. The
distinction between rational habits and myopic habits is also drawn. It is demonstrated that
myopic and rational persons react to transitory shocks in a qualitatively diﬀerent way. In
3a habitual consumption model with rational agents, expectations about future prices and
qualities play a vital role. In contrast, in a myopic habitual consumption model the primary
use of expectations is only to keep the marginal utility of income constant over the life cycle.
Therefore, a virtue of estimating a rational habit consumption model is that it explicitly
accounts for the anticipated and unanticipated eﬀects of price and quality changes.
Economists recognize that people dine for entertainment as well as for nourishment (Muth
1966). Consumer preferences for diﬀerent foods are based on their nutritional contents,
palatability, consumer’s social status, prestige and habits. If nourishment was the sole pur-
pose of dining, the monetary cost of the diet would be very low. With the knowledge of
nutrition at that time, Stigler (1945) estimates that the minimum cost of subsistence in 1944
was $59.88 (in current dollars). This accounts for only less than a quarter of the actual
per capita food outlay in that year. Silberberg (1985) ﬁnds that as income rises, a lower
proportion of food expenditure is allocated to pure nutrition.
Individuals may develop habits over certain food stuﬀ because previous experience with
it induces better appreciation. In the U.S., poultry consumption is a prominent example
of evolving dietary pattern. During World War II, unlike many food commodities, poultry
was not rationed because it was not an important component of people’s diet. Poultry
products marketed were primarily whole birds that not a lot of housewives knew what to do
with. Starting from the 1950’s the integrated form of production continuously drove down
poultry prices. Poultry products started to be marketed in parts and deboned ready-to-cook
forms. New chicken recipes were invented. Fast-food restaurants started to oﬀer such a vast
4variety of chicken meals as nuggets, patties, breast ﬁlets and popcorn chicken. Franchised
restaurants like the Kentucky Fried Chicken were conﬁgured to serve exclusively chicken.
From 1960 to 1999, per capita consumption of poultry products has almost tripled from
about 50% to roughly 150% of beef consumption. This observation has been the momentum
behind the huge literature on structural break in meat demand.
It is postulated in this paper that past (learning) experience with a food product boosts
consumer’s current appreciation of this particular food—the essential argument made in
Stigler and Becker (1977). The medical mechanism by which cigarettes and cocaine hook
addicts up is not needed to induce habits, although recent research indicates that consump-
tion of certain foods may be addictive in the same way as the use of harmful drugs (Wang
et al. 2004).
The organization of the paper is as follows. Before indulging into the theoretical model,
diﬀerent approaches to the economic modeling of habits are brieﬂy described in the next sec-
tion. Section 3 details the meat consumption model with rational habits, where consumption
dynamics are fully discussed. Section 4 concludes this paper.
2 Economic Models of Habits
For consumer demand models, perhaps the most natural way to break intertemporal separa-
bility is to allow for habits. Economic consumption models with habits diﬀer from each other
by their distinct approaches to two basic factors. The ﬁrst factor concerns the constancy
of consumer tastes. Endogenous tastes models such as Ryder and Heal (1973) incorporate
5habits by invoking the concept of subsistence consumption. Dynamics is introduced as past
consumption increases current level of subsistence demand. Because subsistence consump-
tion does not produce felicities, higher level of past consumption results in lower current
level of utility holding current consumption constant.
On the other hand, Stigler and Becker (1977) and Boyer (1978, 1983) posit that tastes do
not change, consumption knowledge does. In their models, habits are modeled as a learning-
by-doing process. The individual learns from his past consumption experience. The more he
learns the more felicities he can get out of a given level of current consumption. Hence, past
consumption is considered to be the consumption capital that results in better appreciation
of current consumption. Despite this sharp distinction between the two model classes, the
mathematics are the same and the characteristics of the optimal consumption path are not
much diﬀerent (Phlips 1983; Boyer 1978).
The second factor is related to consumer rationality. Early literature on habits tends to
model habit-formation as “myopic” or backward-looking (e.g., Pollak and Wales 1969; Pollak
1970). The consumer is myopic in the sense that he is not aware of the impact of his current
consumption decision on future preference. More recent models explore the implications of
consumer rationality on the optimal consumption path of temporally interdependent prefer-
ence (e.g., Ryder and Heal 1973; Boyer 1978, 1983; Becker and Murphy 1988). This paper
takes on issues associated with the second factor and studies the theoretical implications of
incorporating habits and rationality into the meat consumption model.
63 The Model
For expository ease, the theoretical framework is set up in a deterministic and continuous-
time environment. We assume that there exists a representative consumer who maximizes
his lifetime utilities. For now, assume that there are only two goods, the food service that is
potentially habit-forming, and all-other-goods. In the empirical sequel, we allow for multiple
potentially habitual food commodities. The food service provides both nourishment and
entertainment. To prepare the food, three inputs—the raw food material c and its quality
k, and the consumption capital S—are needed. Consider the household food production
function
f = g(c,k,S) (1)
where f is the food service, and g(·) represents the production technology. The quality k
measures the quality attributes of the food material. For instance, k can be an indicator of
food contamination outbreaks, a higher value of which indicates more severe contamination
incidence so that the perceived quality of c is lower while the incidence lasts. Its value
is neither chosen nor priced but exogenous to the household. In this case, the outbreak
can be considered a public good that is a quality characteristic of the privately consumed
good (Bockstael and McConnell 1993). Plausible assumptions of the production function
include: gc > 0, gcc < 0, gk < 0, gs > 0, and gss < 0. Consider food preparation and
consumption as a “learning-by-doing” process, the consumption capital S encapsulates the
experience and knowledge acquired from previous cooking and dining activities. Deﬁne the
consumption capital stock to be an exponentially weighted sum of past levels of consumption:
7S(t) =
R t
0 e−δ(t−τ)c(τ)dτ, with δ being the rate of capital depreciation. Diﬀerentiating this
with respect to t results in the equation of motion for the capital stock
˙ S = c(t) − δS(t). (2)










−rt[y(t) + p(t)c(t)]dt ≤ w(0), (4)
where ρ is the rate of time preference; y(t) is the composite good consumed at time t whose
price is normalized to unity; r is the real interest rate; p(t) is the time t price of raw food
material c; and w(0) is the period 0 value of lifetime wealth. For the utility-maximizing
individual, the decision variables are y(t) and c(t). The budget constraint (4) is valid if
there are perfect capital markets where consumers can borrow at the interest r.














Equation (5) deﬁnes µ as the marginal utility of the discounted lifetime wealth. It can be
shown that, at least under perfect foresight, µ is a constant datum, exactly what a rational
consumer strives to abide by during the life cycle. The second term on the right-hand side
of (6) is the sum of all future beneﬁts (costs if us < 0) accrued through the eﬀect of an
8inﬁnitesimal increase in c(t) on future capital stocks. Hence, equation (6) says that the
marginal utility of c(t) equals the marginal cost of buying one unit of it minus (plus) the
utility value of future beneﬁts (costs). If us 6= 0, from (6), this drives a wedge between the
current marginal utility of c(t) and its contemporaneous marginal cost. In the absence of
such wedge, consumption of the rational consumer responds immediately and fully to outside
shocks.
3.1 Dynamic Behaviors
To simplify the study of the optimal path of c(t) around its steady state, suppose that the
rate of time preference is equal to the real interest rate. Use the following instantaneous
quadratic utility function to linearize the ﬁrst-order conditions (5) and (6):













+ αycy(t)c(t) + αysy(t)S(t) + αcsc(t)S(t) + αckc(t)k(t). (7)
Note that the product quality k enters jointly with c, consistent with the notion that this
quality characteristic alone has no value to the individual. Diﬀerentiate the linearized version
of (6) with respect to t, and use (6) to substitute out the integral term from the result. Then
use the linearized (5) to maximize y(t) out. Performing these operations yields a diﬀerential
equation for c(t)
A1˙ c(t) = B1 + B2 + (ρ + δ)A1c(t) + [(ρ + 2δ)A2 + A3]S(t)
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and B2 = (r + δ)µp(t) −
µ
αyy[(ρ + δ)αyc + αys]. Diﬀerentiate (2) with respect to t and use
(2) and (8) to eliminate c(t) and ˙ c(t), respectively, from the result. This procedure gives a
second-order linear diﬀerential equation in terms of S(t)
(D
2 − ρD − A)S(t) = A
−1
1 [B1 + B2 − (ρ + δ)αckk(t) − µ˙ p(t) + αck˙ k(t)] (9)
where DS(t) =
dS(t)
dt , and A = A
−1
1 [A1δ(ρ + δ) + A2(ρ + 2δ) + A3]. Equation (9) has two




2 , both of which are real. To see this, concavity of the
utility function implies: A1 > 0, A3 > 0 and A1A3 > A2
2. Therefore, whatever sign A2 takes,
ρ2 +4A = A
−1
1 [A1(ρ+2δ)2 +4(ρ+2δ)A2 +4A3] > 0. To demonstrate the solution to (9), it
is convenient to set the right-hand side of (9) equal to −Aψ(t) and rewrite (9) as
(D − λ1)(D − λ2)S(t) = −Aψ(t). (10)
The solution to equation (10) takes the positive unstable root (λ1) forward and the negative

























The solution (11) expresses S(t) as a two-sided distributed lag of the forcing function ψ(t).
Since p(t) and k(t) are elements of ψ(t), current consumption capital stock depends on the
entire time path of future and past prices and quality characteristic. The impact of the lead
or lag forcing function on current consumption capital declines at an exponential rate. By
10equation (2), it is clear that c(t) also depends on all past and future values of its own prices
and quality characteristic.
Roughly speaking, the stable root λ2 is associated with the speed of convergence of the
system to its steady state. To see this, conduct a conceptual experiment: suppose that the
forcing function has been constant at ψ1, implying ˙ k = ˙ p = 0, over a long span of time
such that S(t) reaches its corresponding steady-state value ψ1. Now, there is an unexpected
permanent change in the price or quality characteristic that pushes ψ to ψ2. Substituting
ψ(t) = ψ2 into (11) results in the path by which c(t) travel to its new steady-state ψ2
S(t) = e
λ2t(ψ1 − ψ2) + ψ2. (12)
Larger (absolute) value of λ2 implies higher speed at which c(t) converges to its long-run
steady-state.
The relationship between c(t) and S(t) as S(t) moves toward its new steady state is
implied by equations (2) and (12)
c(t) = (δ + λ2)S(t) − λ2ψ2. (13)
The term (δ + λ2) or equivalently −[(ρ + 2δ)A2 + A3] has to be greater than, equal to, or
less than zero for c(t) and S(t) to be positively related, unrelated, or negatively related,
respectively. A commodity that is positively related over time is said to display adjacent
complementarity (Ryder and Heal 1973). Equation (13) suggests that the less negative λ2 is,
the higher the degree of adjacent complementarity. In other words, goods that are strongly
adjacently complementary (habitual) adjust to their steady states relatively slowly.
11To further explain the condition for adjacent complementarity, it is useful to write this















People develop habits on, say, beef if larger beef consumption in the past increases present
consumption. However, ucs = αcs > 0 alone is not suﬃcient to induce habitual consumption
for rational persons. Beef service oﬀers not only nourishment but also palatability. While
the level of nourishment largely depends on the amount of beef consumed (c), the degree
of palatability relies on the knowledge (S) about how to prepare beef. The rational eater
realizes that as the quantity of beef consumed increases, consumption capital will also rise
for all future periods. In other words, when deciding how much beef to eat, a rational person
takes into account increases in all future utilities resulting from an inﬁnitesimal increase in
current beef consumption. Beef consumption will be habitual only if, ceteris paribus, an
increase in the marginal utility of beef induced by a small increment in the consumption
capital (αcs) suﬃciently outweighs the corresponding decrease in the marginal utility of the
capital stock (αss).
Time preference and the rate of consumption capital depreciation are also important
determinants of the degree of habits. Inequality (14) suggests that the more the rational
person discounts future utilities or the faster consumption capital decays, the higher the
degree of adjacent complementarity. By the ﬁrst-order condition (6), ceteris paribus, greater
ρ and δ reduce future beneﬁts and thus raise uc(t). Therefore, for rational beneﬁcial habits,
12the level of consumption is lower if the time discount or capital depreciation rate is increased.
Intertemporal movement of consumption can be illustrated qualitatively by a phase dia-
gram in the (c,S) space such as in ﬁgure 1 (Abel 1982). The ˙ S = 0 curve is the loci where
consumption capital is stationary, i.e. c = δS. The p1p1 curve represents the loci where
˙ c = 0. It is clear from equation (8) that the p1p1 curve is positively sloped when consump-
tion of c displays adjacent complementarity. The system has a saddle-point structure with
a stable (b1b1) and an unstable (b0b0) manifold. The stable manifold leads to the long-run
equilibrium point E1, while the unstable one breaks away from that point. The rational
consumer always stays on the stable manifold.
3.2 Impacts of Permanent Price and Quality Shocks on Consump-
tion
The most salient feature of the time nonseparable consumption model is its distinction
between short-run and long-run response to permanent price and, in our example, quality
changes as well. In the U.S., the real price of poultry products relative to beef has steadily
declined from one-half that of beef to about one-third over the last forty years. Meanwhile,
the dispersion of health information on cholesterol and saturated fat during the last two
decades has perhaps altered consumer’s perception of the quality of poultry and red meat.
Assume the drop in poultry price and rise in quality relative to red meat are permanent.
The size of the long-run response to such changes depends on the degree of adjacent comple-
mentarity. Diﬀerentiate (10) with respect to the quality characteristic k at the steady state
and make use of the steady-state condition c = δS. This operation yields the long-run re-
13sponse of consumption to a permanent shift in product quality, which is income-compensated







where c denotes the steady-state value of consumption, and ”good” news is represented by
a drop in the value of k. The term A1A has to be positive so that λ2 < 0 for the system
to be stable. Recall from equation (13) that a higher degree of adjacent complementarity
implies lower A1A. Hence, food commodities that are more habit-forming respond more to
permanent quality change in the long run. In the case of a permanent price change, the







Graphically, the time path of c(t) is illustrated in ﬁgure 2. Suppose the individual is
initially on point E1, the long-run equilibrium associated with S = ψ1. When the unantici-
pated news that higher cholesterol is linked to greater chance of heart attack is announced,
consumption of poultry products jumps vertically to point F on the stable manifold asso-
ciated with the new long-run equilibrium E2 and moves toward the new steady state over
time. The quantity in (15) measures the vertical distance between E1 and E2. For red meat,
the cholesterol information may cause a permanent drop in product quality. So its demand
works in the opposite direction—a vertical drop followed by gradual movement toward a
lower steady-state equilibrium.
The hazard associated with cholesterol and saturated fats in red meat is long-term and
chronic and requires sustained consumption. This information may not only aﬀect quality
14but also consumption capital in the utility function. In fact, it is plausible that cholesterol
information causes a little or no change in k, but a much greater change in the parameter
values of the utility function. Negative health news for red meat may have reduced the value










dαys − dαss. (17)
If αyc ≥ 0 and αys > 0, the term in the brackets on the right-hand side of (17) is guar-
anteed to be negative. Since a higher A1A is associated with a lower degree of adjacent
complementarity, negative health news could lower the degree of habitual consumption of
red meat.
The long-run response of consumption to a change in wealth is derived by diﬀerentiating
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Because greater wealth lowers the marginal utility of wealth µ, the food commodity c is a
normal good if (18) is less than zero. If the cholesterol information has reduced αys but raised
A1A, equation (18) should be less negative for red meat consumption. The same argument
applies to demand response to quality shock (15) and price change (16). Indeed, Sarmiento
(2005) ﬁnds that demand for red meats has become less own-price and income elastic in the
1990s than in the 1950s and 1970s.
153.3 Time Path of Consumption in Response to Temporary Changes
Public concerns about food safety issues have recently stimulated research on the economic
impacts of food contamination outbreaks (e.g., Thomsen and McKenzie 2001; Piggott and
Marsh 2004). Unlike heart disease linked to cholesterol and dietary fats, ailments due to
intake of contaminated food are much more acute and sustained consumption is not required
to develop the symptoms. This section is aimed at characterizing the theoretical time path
of meat consumption, under rational habits, in response to food safety events that result in
temporary quality change.
Suppose there is an unanticipated outbreak of bird ﬂuenza in East Asia. Reliable sources
estimate that clean-up eﬀort will take time ˆ T after which the quality of chicken products
will return to its normal level. If the consumer is at a steady state S = ψ1 at t = 0, the
moment right before the incidence, and if the jump in k results in ψ(t) = ψ2 for t ∈ (0, ˆ T] in
equation (11), and ψ(t) = ψ1 for t ∈ (ˆ T,∞), the initial response of consumption capital to
the postulated square wave pulse in k(t) is obtained by taking the unstable positive root λ1
foward and rearranging terms:
˙ S(0) = λ2(ψ1 − ψ2)(1 − e
−λ1 ˆ T). (19)
Because
∂ψ(t)
∂k(t) < 0, the food safety incidence that raises k will cause an initial drop in
consumption capital. The size of this drop is larger if the incidence is more permanent
(higher ˆ T). Equation (12) implies that the initial response of S to a permanent jump in
k is λ2(ψ1 − ψ2). For the initial response to a temporary outbreak to be κ percent of the
initial impact response to a permanent quality change, the incidence has to last for time
16ˆ T = −
ln(1−κ)
λ1 . Note that equation (19) equals the size of the initial jump in consumption
c when the individual is assumed to be at its long-run equilibrium before the outbreak.
The initial response to temporary shock is smaller than that due to the permanent change
because a rational consumer knows that food consumption is habitual and that quality of
the product will eventually return to its initial value.
The path of poultry consumption is illustrated in ﬁgure 3. Before the news of a ﬂuenza
outbreak the consumer is at the steady state point E1. The unexpected incidence induces the
individual to reduce poultry consumption to J2 right after the news is reported. The curve
p2p2 represents the ˙ c = 0 loci corresponding to the declined quality of poultry products as
the incidence lasts. Since the consumer is aware that the event will be temporary, point J2
will not be on the stable manifold associated with the lower equilibrium E2 but somewhere
above it. Suppose duration of the outbreak is precisely foreseen. Then the size of the initial
reduction will be calculated such that by the moment the incidence comes to a halt, the
individual is already on J1—the point on the stable manifold leading toward the initial steady
state E1. The time path of consumption in response to temporary quality deterioration is
characterized by an initial drop in consumption followed by gradual return to its pre-outbreak
level. The eﬀect of a temporary price hike would be analogously analyzed.
3.4 Rationality vs. Myopia
The prediction that the long-run response to a permanent shock is larger than the short-run
response is not unique to the rational habit persistence model. Myopic habits similarly imply
sluggish adjustment of consumption to permanent price or quality change. The more elastic
17long-run demand is also a possible outcome under myopic habit persistence. For example,
in their test of myopic habit persistence, Heien and Durham (1991) ﬁnd that consumption
adjusts to permanent price change more in the long run than in the short run. In fact, there
has been a long history to include lagged consumption in the system of demand analysis
(e.g., Pollak and Wales 1969; Houthakker and Taylor 1970). The success of using lagged
consumption in predicting current consumption has been accredited to habit eﬀects, cost of
adjustment or simply ignorance on the part of the researcher. In the meat demand literature,
Pope, Green and Eales (1980) and Holt and Goodwin (1997) explicitly model myopic habit
persistence and ﬁnd it to be an important feature of consumer preference for meat product.
Some studies also recognize the importance of consumption dynamics by ﬁrst-diﬀerencing
the data (e.g., Eales and Unnevehr 1988), because the use of ﬁrst-diﬀerenced data implicitly
assigns a massive weight to lagged consumption.
Unless there are sizable transaction costs associated with forward-looking behavior or
lagged consumption actually proxies omitted variables such as demographics that change
slowly, the paucity of a forward-looking meat demand model with habits appears to be at
odds with the unquestioned consumer rationality (in the static and myopic habits models)
about the preference structure underlying the demand analysis. If substantial consumption
habits indeed exist, it is unlikely that such knowledge—acquirable with repeated observations
and experience—can be ignored by rational individuals.
In a myopic habits model the consumer is not aware of the impact of his current level of
consumption on his future utilities. Because of this ignorance, he makes systematic errors in
18his intertemporal optimization. The individual is constantly surprised in each period to learn
that his past consumption of the good contributes to the buildup of the capital stock. This
leads to period-by-period re-planning of intertemporal demand conditional on the current
level of consumption capital stock. This ignorance implies that the consumption path of
a myopic individual is qualitatively diﬀerent from the demand path of a rational consumer
when faced with a transitory price or quality shock.
To demonstrate this diﬀerence, it is helpful to describe the myopic consumer’s problem in
a discrete-time environment so that the period-by-period replanning of consumption schedule
is clearly deﬁned. To preserve comparability with the rational habits model, assume that the
myopic consumer maximizes the discrete-time version of the lifetime utility (3) subject to the
lifetime budget constraint (4). This setup actually retains the minimal consumer rationality
in allocating limited resources across time periods. So the only myopia on the part of the
individual is about how the consumption capital is seen to evolve over time. Myopic agents
believe that the capital stock is static while it de facto evolves according to the discrete-time
version of (2), St+1 = ct + (1 − δ)St. Suppose at the beginning of period 0, the consumer
initially plans according to the ﬁrst-order conditions: ∂ut
∂˜ yt = (
1+ρ
1+r)tµ0 and ∂ut
∂˜ ct = (
1+ρ
1+r)tµ0pt
∀t ≥ 0. The tilde over y and c denotes that these are planned quantities that may or may not
be the same as the realized consumption for t > 0. The ﬁrst and second ﬁrst-order conditions
are, respectively, the discrete-time equivalents of (5) and (6), except that the second term on
the right-hand side of (6) is absent from its myopic discrete-time counterpart. The subscript
0 on µ emphasizes that, at period 0, the myopic consumer expects the marginal utility of
19wealth to be ﬁxed during the life cycle. Use the discrete-time version of the utility (7) to
linearize the ﬁrst-order conditions assuming ρ = r, and maximize y out. Upon completing
these steps, one is able to write the following equation for planned consumption
















If the myopic consumer is not initially in a steady state, the realized ct will be diﬀerent from
the one planned for at the beginning of period 0 because the capital stock St will not be
the same as S0. Replacing S0 in (20) with St gives the realized consumption at t that is
income-compensated to hold the marginal utility of discounted wealth ﬁxed at µ0. Unlike
consumption of rational individuals, the demand by myopic consumers is largely backward-
looking. The only forward-looking component is the marginal utility of discounted wealth
that is implicitly a function of the money endowment, prices and quality characteristics in
all periods. For c and S to be positively related, one needs A2 < 0 since A1 > 0 by the
strict concavity of the utility function. From the deﬁnition of A2, adjacent complementarity
requires
αysαyc
αyy < αcs. If consumption of meat is considered to be beneﬁcial even after
negative information becomes available (αys > 0) and if αyc ≥ 0, this inequality will hold
insofar as greater past consumption increases present marginal utility of consumption, i.e.
αcs > 0.
While A2 < 0 is a suﬃcient condition for people to develop myopic habits, it is necessary
but not suﬃcient to induce habitual consumption for rational persons who also evaluate
future beneﬁts derived from the current level of consumption. The magnitude of −A
−1
1 A2 in
(20) relative to δ+λ2 in (13) is indeterminate, i.e. the degree of adjacent complementarity of
20a myopic person relative to that of a rational individual is unknown a priori. Nevertheless,
it is possible to have the case where −A
−1
1 A2 > 0 but δ + λ2 = 0. When δ + λ2 is equal to
zero, rational individuals behave as if preferences are intertemporally separable.
Our approach has been to model past quantities consumed as part of the consumption
capital that induces better present appreciation of the good. But it has been a popular
practice to let current utility level depend on the diﬀerence between present consumption
and a weighted sum of past levels of consumption (e.g., Constantinides 1990; Dynan 2000).
Under this formulation, the good must display adjacent complementarity regardless of the
values of other parameters in the utility function (see Becker 1996, p. 122). Muellbauer
(1988) shows that, conditional on this latter speciﬁcation of preference, myopic persons tend
to experience habitual consumption less than rational agents do. The real possibility that
myopic consumption may be more habitual than rational consumption under our preference
setup qualiﬁes Muellbauer’s result.
To see how myopic persons respond diﬀerently from rational individuals to quality or
price shocks, apply the scenario associated with ﬁgure 3 to a myopic consumer. Suppose
that at period 0 the individual is at a steady state. At the beginning of period 1, the quality
characteristic jumps upward due to a meat contamination accident, and remains at this
level until the crisis is salvaged ˆ T periods later. Note that unlike rational habits, whether
this event is anticipated or not does not aﬀect the magnitude of the initial reaction by
myopic consumers since there is no lead price or quality characteristic in the determination
of consumption. In other words, expectations play little role in myopic persons’ consumption
21decision except for their role in the calculation of µ. The initial quality deterioration causes
c to drop instantly and consequently lowers S. This in turn further decreases the level of
c until period 1 + ˆ T when the accident comes to an end. Hence, in sharp contrast with a
rational agent, a myopic person continuously lowers consumption until meat quality goes
back to its original level.
In principle this distinction could be used to empirically distinguish rational habits from
myopic habits. But the temporary nature of the incidence has to be known a priori for
the rational and myopic individuals to react diﬀerently. It is not immediately clear how
uncertainty about the future of an outbreak or price hike will play in the consumer’s decision
making. But if this uncertainty makes rational agents respond as if shocks were permanent,
behavioral diﬀerences between rational and myopic consumers facing a truly transitory event
will be much less clear-cut. In this case both types of consumption paths are characterized
by gradual adjustment over time, although there is no reason to expect that the size and
speed of adjustment will be identical.
There have been a small number of studies on meat demand in reaction to food safety
concerns. Marsh et al. (2004) ﬁnd, using the Rotterdam model, that the USDA meat product
recall events signiﬁcantly impact U.S. consumer demand for meat, while newspaper reports of
food safety events do not. But the impacts of recalls on meat demand are small in magnitude.
Using the AIDS model, Piggott and Marsh (2004) are able to estimate statistically signiﬁcant
but small eﬀects of newspaper articles on food safety issues on consumer preferences for meat.
The upshot from these two studies is that information on meat product quality has very small
22inﬂuence on U.S. meat demand. But, this does not necessarily suggest that consumers do
not care about food safety. If meat consumption is habitual and if people are rational,
meat quality shocks that are believed to be transitory will have much smaller eﬀects on
quantity consumed than shocks thought to persist for much longer periods. This raises the
question of how the credibility of government agencies and the food industry in dealing with
food contamination situations interacts with consumer demand. Government health and
agricultural agencies and the food industry may often be the only sources of information
for the wider public. If their reputation for oﬀering trust-worthy food safety information is
damaged, it may be extremely costly to restore consumer conﬁdence. Since expectations play
a more critical role in consumption with rational habits than in consumption with myopic
habits, dissemination of credible information seems to be more welfare-enhancing in a society
with rational individuals.
3.5 Empirical Strategies
Equation (2) speciﬁes current capital stock as a weighted average of all past level of consump-
tion. For practical purposes, an empirically feasible structure for consumption capital has to
be assumed. Following the vast majority of econometric model of rational habit persistence,
it is assumed that current consumption capital is equal to the quantity consumed in the last
period, i.e. St = ct−1. Suppose the consumption decision is made at the beginning of each
period. Under uncertainty, the representative person maximizes the following discrete-time
23intertemporal value function
Vt(wt,ct−1) = max
ytct {ut(yt,ct,ct−1) + β
−1Et[Vt+1(wt+1,ct)]} (21)
where wt is the lifetime wealth discounted to the beginning of period t, the discount factor
β = 1 + ρ and Et is the expectation operator conditional upon the information available at
t. The wealth equation of motion is: wt+1 = (1 + rt)(wt − yt − ctpt). The standard Euler
equation for the expected utility maximizing consumer who revises plans according to newly
available information is: γt = β−1(1 + rt)Et[γt+1], where γt is the marginal utility of wealth













−1(1 + rt)Et[γt+1]. (23)
Using (22) to eliminate Et[γt+1] from the right-hand side of (23) and replacing expectations










where εt is the part of
∂ut+1
∂ct that is unanticipated at the beginning of period t. If agents form
rational expectations, εt will be orthogonal to It—the information set at the beginning of
period t, i.e. E[εt·zit] = 0 for all zit ∈ It. In principle, any price, income and quality variable
dated at t or earlier, and quantity at t − 1 or earlier could be included in It. Equation (24)
remains to be parameterized. In the sequel, we estimate a more parsimonious speciﬁcation
of the preference structure that permits multiple habitual goods. The generalized method of
moments of Hansen (1982) can be used for consistent estimation of the parameters in (24).
24There is still one very visible empirical diﬃculty to be dealt with. Econometric models
of rational addiction to harmful substances are often interested in the short- and long-run
demand response to tax changes. Unfortunately, unlike taxes the consumer-perceived quality
characteristic k is not observable by econometricians. Newspaper article indices, as have been
used in a number of studies, are one way to proxy the quality information available to the
public. But the amount of public information may not match perfectly with consumers’
perceptions of product quality. For instance, a one-month-only skyrocketing of the news
reporting of BSE incidences may change the perceived beef quality for more than a month.
How news information is processed by consumers and is transformed into quality perception
is complex and diﬃcult to quantify. If news indices are incorporated into the estimation,
extra caution should be exercised in interpreting these results.
3.6 Does the Model Match Reality?
Traditionally, macroeconomists have been interested in the role of rational habit persistence
in solving the ”equity premium puzzle” of Mehra and Prescott (1985) or other relevant
issues. Empirical tests of rational consumption habits deliver mixed results. As practitioners
attempt to use micro level data for such tests, they usually ﬁnd that most of the available
data sets contain very limited information on household consumption. Nevertheless, food
consumption is readily available and reported. Actually, all of the only ﬁve empirical studies
with micro data test the signiﬁcance of rational habit persistence in food consumption. Naik
and Moore (1996) use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data and ﬁnd rational
habits being an important feature of household food consumption. But Dynan (2000) fails
25to estimate statistically signiﬁcant rational habit eﬀect on the consumption of food in the
PSID data. Meghir and Weber (1996) also do not ﬁnd evidence of rational habits in food
consumption at home in the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). Guariglia and Rossi
(2002) use data from the British Household Panel Survey for the period 1992-97. Their
results indicate signiﬁcant nonseparability in consumer preferences. But this consumption
interdependence takes the form of durability as opposed to habit persistence. Carraso,
Labeaga and L´ opez-Salido (2005) improve on the econometric technique used in Meghir and
Weber and provide evidence that rational habits are important characterization of food-at-
home consumption for a panel of Spanish households.
For more disaggregated commodities, the rational addiction literature oﬀers much evi-
dence in favor of modeling some harmful addictive substances such as cigarettes in a rational
habits framework (e.g., Chaloupka 1991; Becker, Grossman and Murphy 1994; Gruber and
Kszegi 2001). Richards, Patterson and Tegene (2004) employ a panel data of the U.S. house-
holds’ snack consumption and ﬁnd evidence of rational addiction to carbohydrates. However,
Adda (2001) uses the 1996 ”mad cow” crisis as a natural experiment to study the attitudes
of a panel of French households toward health risks. He largely rules out intertemporal
nonseparability in consumer preferences for beef. Instead, his results are interpreted in favor
of a theory of endogenous discount rate such as Grossman (1972). Clearly more research is
needed to shed more light on the issue of habit persistence in food consumption.
264 Concluding Remarks
The meat consumption behavior has drawn substantial resources from the agricultural econo-
mists. Interests in this area include identifying factors besides income and prices that are
important in explaining the pattern of meat demand. However, most empirical models are
based on some variant of the classical static demand model. It is demonstrated that there are
some novel theoretical implications from incorporating habits and consumer rationality into
the meat consumption model. Speciﬁcally, we have made the distinction between short-run
and long-run demand response to permanent or temporary price and quality shocks. The
diﬀerence between myopic and rational habits is also highlighted. These tasks are achieved
with a modiﬁed Becker and Murphy model of intertemporally optimizing agents with con-
sumption habits. Future research is needed to assess the quantitative importance of these
distinctions in order to establish the eﬃcacy of molding rational consumption habits into
the standard meat demand models.
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